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Abstract
We analyse the eﬀect of learning by doing on ﬁrm performances
when proﬁt maximization follows a rule of thumb. Three regimes are
compared: the technology sharing cartels, the oligopoly with spillovers,
the proprietary regime. We show the dynamic implications on the in-
dustrial structure when ﬁrm production plan is revisited period by
period.
Keywords: Oligopoly, Cartel, Industrial Structure, Learning, Dy-
namic Behaviour, Rule of Thumb.
JEL classiﬁcation: L10, L13.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A common assumption in game-theoretical models is that agents have per-
fect knowledge of the environment in which they act without any cognitive
limitation: they know the consequences of their actions and of the actions
of their competitor; consequently any consideration pertaining to whether
and how agents will be able to arrive at some optimal equilibrium have been
fully abstracted from. The success of this approach in oligopoly theory is
due both to analytical tractability and conceptual reasons.
In a real oligopolistic context, players knowledge of the underlying game
may be erroneous on several accounts; for instance, they may have only an
estimate of the demand function in their market, or imperfect or lagged
information about the production of rival ﬁrms. Such considerations lead
to the question of what should be the reasonable features of the dynamic
behaviour of the players and under which conditions the dynamic adjustment
converges to a Nash equilibrium.
A central question in the literature on learning and adaptive process in
dynamic games is whether the repeated interaction between players will even-
tually lead the system, in the long run, to the Nash equilibrium. In this
growing literature there is an explicit description of the possible ways play-
ers attempt to learn the game, to recognize the behaviour of others, or to
adapt over time (e.g., through reinforcement, imitation, belief updating).
We consider a very simple learning process that requires a very low cogni-
tive eﬀort of players and does require information about only previous rivals’
actions and previous game payoﬀ functions. We assume that the players be-
have as local maximizers: at each time period they adjust their quantities
over time, proportional to their marginal proﬁts. The players increase or de-
crease their strategy choice in response to proﬁtability signals derived from
marginal proﬁts of the previous period. This kind of adjustment mechanism
has been proposed by a few authors, in continuous-time formulations (see,
for example, Arrow et al. (1958), Corchon and Mas-Colell (1996)), and in
discrete-time framework (see, for example, Bischi and Naimzada (2000)).
We study the consequences of this learning process in the context of a
quantity-setting duopoly with homogeneous goods where players can learn
both by doing and from each other. It is widely recognized that produc-
tion learning eﬀects are not entirely ﬁrm-speciﬁc; indeed, they may spill
over from one ﬁrm to another in many ways (Arrow(1962), Spence(1981) ).
Technological spillovers may be the result of explicit cooperation contracts
2between ﬁrms of a speciﬁc industrial sector. Many recent studies consider
the consequences of sharing knowledge on market prices and quantities in
a static context (recently among others Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988), Katz
and Ordover (1990), Baumol (1992)).
In a dynamic setting, Petit and Tolwinski (1992) consider a duopolistic
framework with homogenous products where the spillover phenomena may
take the form of full knowledge transfer; Tolwinski and Zaccour (1995) extend
the framework by considering diﬀerentiated products and more general and
realistic spillover scenarios.
Our model is presented in a discrete setting over an inﬁnite time horizon
as a two-person dynamic game with diﬀerent assumption on spillover eﬀects.
The players’ decision variables are quantities to produce, that are updated
every period according to a local and correct estimate of the marginal proﬁt
obtained from the previous period, for example through market experiments.
In Section 2 is formulated the general framework of the model. In Section
3 we describe the adjustment process based on a rule of thumb mechanism
and the two scenarios that can occur. In section 4 we present the simulations
o ft h ea s y m m e t r i cc a s e ,w h i l ei nS e c t i o n5t h es y m m e t r i cc a s ei sd i s c u s s e d .
Interpretation of the results concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The general framework of our model consists in two ﬁrms, producing a ho-
mogeneous good with constant returns to scale technology. The production
process of each ﬁrm is inﬂuenced by a learning by doing process resulting in a
reduction of the unit cost as the cumulative production of the ﬁrm increases.
The unit production cost is further reduced if technological spillovers arise
between ﬁrms. We are implicitly assuming complementarity of the ﬁrm in-
novation process: exchanging information is beneﬁcial for each ﬁrm. The
presence of technological spillovers and its intensity distinguish the three dif-
ferent regimes of our analysis. If the ﬁrm speciﬁc technological information
is not spread in the economic system, the proprietary regime is deﬁned. In
this case strong information protection is assumed, preventing any outside
information ﬂow of the innovation process adopted by the ﬁrm. Instead if
involuntary technological spillovers occur between ﬁrms, we are in the case
of a duopoly in which the production process is inﬂuenced by a positive ex-
ternality eﬀect. On the contrary, voluntary and shared spillovers deﬁne our
3third regime, the technological sharing cartel setting (TSC).
In every regime, each ﬁrm is facing a dynamic maximisation problem in
discrete time ` al aC o u r n o t . We are assuming a bounded rationality frame-
work. The ﬁrm is not maximising the present discounted value of the proﬁt
over an inﬁnite horizon, but in each period the ﬁrm is adjusting its produc-
tion according to its marginal proﬁt of the previous period, assuming that the
rival proﬁt is constant. The aim of this paper is to analyse the consequences
of this assumption on the industrial structure of the economic system.
To ﬁx the notation, let i =1 ,2t h eﬁrm index and qit ≥ 0 the output
produced by ﬁrm i at time t. Since we are assuming a dynamic Cournot
game, qit is also the control variable of our model. The aggregate quantity
produced at time t is deﬁned as: Qt = q1t + q2t. We assumed a constant




with β =1 /B where B
is the demand elasticity. The cumulative output equation is given by:
wit+1 = wit + qit (1)
where wit is the total output accumulated at time t, interpreted as a
proxy of the ﬁrm level of experience in term of innovation process capability.
The state variable wit inﬂuences the cost condition of the ﬁrm, reducing the
unit cost of production. With the presence of technological spillovers, the
unit production cost is further reduced. The learning curve of each ﬁrm in
the more general setting when there are involuntary technological spillovers
is represented as follows:
ci(wi)=c
0





i is the asymptotic value of the marginal cost function, α in-
dicates the intensity of the positive spillover externality between ﬁrm, Di
the rate of cost decreasing occurring in the production process. In this case,
thus we are in the second regime previously mentioned: we are depicting a
Cournot duopoly with involuntary transmission of technological experience
between ﬁrms. The unit cost reduction is not only caused by the ﬁrm spe-
ciﬁc learning by doing process (the ﬁrm speciﬁcc u m u l a t i v ee x p e r i e n c ewi)
but also by involuntary changing of information (wj) . I f ,i n s t e a d ,t h ei n -








where w = w1+w2 is the aggregate cumulative output. The law of motion
of w is given by:
wt+1 = wt + q1t + q2t (4)
In this case, ﬁrms agree to form technological consortium in order to take
advantages in fully interchange the ﬁrm speciﬁc technological experience.
This is the case of the technological sharing cartel regime. On the contrary,
if α =0 ,w ea r ei nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s ew h e r et h et e c h n o l o g i c a le x p e r i e n c ei s
fully protected by the ﬁrm: any exchange of information is not allowed. No
spillovers arise in the system. This condition deﬁnes the proprietary regime,








The proﬁt maximisation function diﬀers in each regimes. In the propri-
etary regime (P) the proﬁtf u n c t i o ni nt i m et is given by:
π
P






i ]( 6 )
In the duopoly with technological spillovers (DRS) instead the proﬁtf u n c -
tion is as follow:
π
DRS
it = qit[A(q1t + q2t)
−β − c
0
i(1 + wi + αwj)
−Di + c
min
i ]( 7 )
In the technological sharing cartels (TSC), the proﬁti sd e ﬁned as:
π
TSC











Figure 1: Firm decisional process when the marginal proﬁt is positive.
3 The Dynamics
On the contrary with the literature of this ﬁeld of research (Tolwinski and Za-
ccour (1995), Petit and Tolwinski (1996) (1998)), we are assuming a bounded
rationality framework, where the two producers have no global knowledge of
the market. So they are not able to reach a Nash equilibrium in one shot.They
have to behave following a rule of thumb adjustment process based only on
a local knowledge of the marginal proﬁt of the previous period, ∂πR
it\qR
it, ob-
tained, for example, through market research. In each regime R= P, DRS,
TSC, a ﬁrm decides to increase its production in time t + 1 if it perceives a
positive marginal proﬁt in the previous period and to decrease its production











Graphically, the dynamical behaviours analysed in this paper can be qual-
itatively interpreted by the following ﬁgures (Figure 1, Figure 2). In Figure













Figure 2: Firm 2 decisional process when the marginal proﬁti sn e g a t i v ei n
t +2 .
period by period due to the own learning by doing eﬀect and or the positive
spillover of the other ﬁrm. If in period t the ﬁrm produces qt with positive
marginal proﬁt, in the following period it will expand its production to qt+1
according to the adaptive adjustment process previously described. At this
production level, the marginal proﬁt are still positive because of the expan-
sion of its proﬁt area resulting from learning by doing activities and eventual
positive spillover eﬀects. Such benchmark can be used to describe both the
advantage ﬁrm behaviour period by period and the behaviour of the less
advantaged ﬁrm when the positive eﬀect of learning by doing and eventual
spillovers overcome the negative eﬀect on proﬁts induced by the increasing
market power of the rival.
7In the Figure 2, instead, we show the case in which the ﬁrm is forced to
exit the market since its market conditions are highly unfavourable. Indeed,
the marginal proﬁts in qt+2 are negative because the marginal cost reduction
does not compensate the proﬁt area reduction due to the market power of
the other ﬁrm. In the following period the ﬁrm is forced to decrease its
production. A vicious process will start: the production is reduced period
by period till the exit of the ﬁrm from the market.
4 The Asymmetric Case
In this case we compare the time paths of price, individual quantity and
proﬁto ft h eﬁrms under the diﬀerent three regimes assuming asymmetric
cost conditions. The asymmetry in cost conditions may arise from three
diﬀerent reasons. Firstly, we consider the eﬀect of diﬀerent initial unit costs
on the variable paths (c0
1 6= c0
2). Secondly, the eﬀect of diﬀerent asymptotic
values of the unit cost are analysed (cmin
1 6= cmin
2 ). Thirdly, we focus on
diﬀerences in term of the rate of cost decreasing (D1 6= D2).
In all the simulations performed, we have tried to select numerical values
of the initial conditions and of the parameters as more sensitive as possible.
We have assigned the value of 1.5 for the elasticity of demand since it is sup-
ported by empirical studies (see Malerba (1992)). Considering that diﬀerent
magnitudes of the demand scaling parameter A and v do not qualitatively
aﬀect the variable paths, we have chosen A =1 0a n dv =0 .8. The initial
individual quantities have been set equal to 1 and the initial cumulative ex-
perience null for both the ﬁr m . I ne a c hs i m u l a t i o nw eh a v ep e r f o r m e d1 0 1
iterations.
In Figure 3, 4, 5 we present the time paths respectively for the individual
quantity, price and individual proﬁt, when the source of asymmetry is given
only by a small diﬀerence in the initial costs. We have assumed an initial cost
advantage for ﬁrm 1, ﬁxing c0
1 =1a n dc0
2 = 3. The values of the other cost
parameters are identical for each ﬁrm: D1 = D2 =0 .31 and cmin
1 = cmin
2 =
0.1. In this case, only the ﬁrm having a comparatively unfavorable position
has incentives to create the technology sharing cartel. After few periods, it
can improve its economic conditions since having access to the experience of
the other ﬁrm can shortly diminish its cost disadvantage. Thus, it is not in
the interest of the dominant ﬁrm to join the cartel. In brief time, its market





















Figure 3: Time paths of each ﬁrm output under a small diﬀerence in initial
costs (c0
1 =1a n dc0













Figure 4: Time paths of prices under a small diﬀerence in initial costs (c0
1 =1
and c0





















Figure 5: Time paths of each ﬁrm proﬁts under a small diﬀerence in initial
costs (c0
1 =1a n dc0











Figure 6: Time paths of prices under a bigger asymmetry in the initial costs
(c0
1 =0 .5a n dc0
2 =3 .6) and diﬀerent spillover eﬀects.
power position can be threatened by the rival . The dominant ﬁrm prefers
to keep its knowledge privately: the cost reduction due to the accumulated
quantity of the competitor does not compensate the proﬁtr e d u c t i o nd u et o
the increasing favourable position of the rival. In this case, monopolisation
never occurs in the market.
Diﬀerent results arise if the diﬀerence in initial cost is bigger (in Figure 7
we show the proﬁt behaviors when c0
1 =0 .5a n dc0
2 =3 .6). The results of the
literature in this ﬁeld that voluntary or involuntary spillovers can prevent
monopolisation in the market are still conﬁrmed. Circulation of know-how
lowers the price level and increases the quantity, improving social welfare (see
Figure 6 and 7). In addition, both the ﬁrms have great incentives to enter




















Figure 7: Time paths of individual proﬁts under a bigger asymmetry in the
initial costs (c0
1 =0 .5a n dc0
2 =3 .6) and diﬀerent spillover eﬀects.
the technological sharing cartel (α1 = α2 = 1) than in the duopoly with
technological spillover (α1 = α2 =0 .5) and in the case in which information
is not spread in the market (α1 = α2 = 0) even for the dominant ﬁrm (see
Figure 7). In this case the initial cost diﬀerence is so consistent that the
dominant ﬁrm does not occur the risk of loosing the beneﬁts of its market
power position.
We are now analysing the eﬀect on the variable trajectories assuming
diﬀe r e n ta s y m p t o t i cv a l u e so ft h eu n i tc o s tp a r a m e t e r s . W eh a v es e tt h e
initial cost for each ﬁrm equal to 3, while all the other numerical values
are identical to the simulations previously presented. It is remarkable to
























Figure 8: Time paths of each ﬁrm proﬁts under a small diﬀerence in the
asymptotic value of the marginal cost (cmin
1 =0a n dcmin
2 =0 .1) and diﬀerent
spillover eﬀects.
t h es y m m e t r i cc a s e( cmin
1 =0a n dcmin
2 =0 .1) the market beneﬁts from
technological transfers between ﬁrms (Figure 8) and monopolisation does
not occur.
The less advantaged ﬁr ms t i l lw i l lo p e r a t ei nt h el o n gr u ni nt h em a r k e t
even if there isn’t knowledge dissemination. Only assuming a slightly bigger
diﬀerence in the minimum cost (cmin
1 =0cmin
2 =0 .9), the less advantaged
ﬁrm will leave the market in all the three regimes analysed (Figure 9). The
cost gap diﬀerence can not be compensated by learning by doing cost reduc-
tion even in the case of voluntary sharing knowledge. The less advantaged
ﬁrm periodically reduces the quantity produced since it always faces negative




















Figure 9: Time paths of each ﬁrm proﬁts under a bigger asymmetry in the
asymptotic value of the marginal cost (cmin
1 =0a n dcmin
2 =0 .9) and diﬀerent
spillover eﬀects.
marginal proﬁts. In this case the dominant ﬁrm has signiﬁcant incentives to
protect its know how because of the negligible beneﬁts of the learning by
doing activity of the competitor.
As the last source of asymmetry, we consider diﬀerent learning rates.
Figure 10 represents the long run behavior of the proﬁts assigning a small
diﬀerence in the rate of learning (D1 =0 .35 D2 =0 .3): each ﬁrm maximises
its proﬁt under TSC and the less advantaged ﬁrm survives even in the pro-
prietary regime. As before, the results are quite diﬀerent if the magnitude of
cost asymmetry is bigger.


















Figure 10: Time paths of each ﬁrm proﬁts under a small diﬀerence in learning






















Figure 11: Time paths of each ﬁrm proﬁts under a bigger asymmetry in
learning rates (D1 =0 .25 D2 =0 .5) and diﬀerent spillover eﬀects.
D1 =0 .25 D2 =0 .5. In this case only the access to the technological experi-
ence of the dominant ﬁrm can prevent the market exit of the less advantaged
ﬁrm. But the dominant ﬁrm has very little incentive to join the technology
cartels since its proﬁts are higher in the proprietary regime. In this case only
an institutional intervention can encourage technological sharing agreements.
5 The Symmetric Case
After having discussed the asymmetric cases, in this section we present the














Figure 12: Output of the ﬁrm in diﬀerent regimes and in the full collusion.
characteristics and conditions. In this case the results of the dynamic cartels
analysed by Petit & Tolwinski (1996) maximising the actual value of the ﬂow
of proﬁts are substantially conﬁrmed even assuming a bounded rationality
context. The performances of the three regimes are valuated also comparing
them with the monopoly situation (the collusion case: see the appendix for
a detailed description). We have selected the following values for the cost
parameters: c0
1 = c0
2 =2 ,D1 = D2 =0 .3, cmin
1 = cmin
2 =0 .1. The numerical
values of the other parameters are identical to the previous section (A =1 0 ,
v =0 .8, B =1 .5). We have assumed identical initial conditions in each
market structure analysed (q10 = q20 =1a n dw10 = w20 = 0). Under this
conditions, the technology sharing cartels generates higher levels of quantities
and lower prices than the other market conﬁgurations both in the short and












Figure 13: Prices under diﬀerent regimes and the full collusion.
It doesn’t seem that the free-rider eﬀect in the transmission of knowledge
analysed by Spence (1981) and Fudenberg & Tirole (1983, 1986) arise in
this context. In fact both the ﬁrms have great incentives in investing in
learning by doing activity from the beginning. The aggressiveness of the
ﬁrm in term of output target doesn’t change from the short to the long run
period. A possible interpretation of this fact can be found in the particular
decisional process adopted by the ﬁrms. In each period the ﬁrm decides its
output target on the basis of the marginal proﬁt of the previous period. Both
the ﬁrm are periodically responding with the same intensity to the marginal
proﬁt obtained (v1 = v2). The parameter v can be interpreted as a proxy of
the ﬁrm aggressiveness, that in our case is constant in every single interaction
computed.













Figure 14: Proﬁts of the ﬁrm in diﬀerent regimes and in the full collusion
case.
In brief, observing ﬁgure 12, 13 the standard results of the beneﬁcial ef-
fects of voluntary knowledge transmission on social welfare are thus conﬁrmed
since they can guarantee higher quantity and lower price in comparison to
the other market structure. But surprisingly, the proﬁt trajectory of the
technological sharing cartel is similar to the collusion case: only in the very
short run the monopoly proﬁt sa r eh i g h e rt h a ni nt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h e r e
is an agreement in the knowledge transmission. They cross twice: after few
interactions and in the long run. In the middle period the technological con-
sortium can even lead to higher proﬁts than the collusion case (see Figure
14).
206 Interpretation and Conclusion
This paper analyses the importance of technological spillover and TSC agree-
ments in a dynamic setting, in which two ﬁrms adopt a rule of thumb deci-
sional process. Output of each ﬁr mi sr e v i s e dp e r i o db yp e r i o da c c o r d i n gt o
proﬁtability signals of the previous period. The long run behaviour of the
market variables is diﬀerent according to the source of asymmetry in the cost
function and the entity of this asymmetry.
From our simulations, the principal results of the asymmetric case can be
summarised as follows:
• in the case of a mild asymmetry in the initial costs, the monopolisation
never occurs despite the voluntary or involuntary degree of information
transfers between the ﬁrms (Figure 3,4,5);
• we observe also that, if the gap in the initial costs is low, the dominant
ﬁrm does not have any incentive to join the Technology Sharing Cartel.
In this case, the less advantaged ﬁrm has more beneﬁts form the access
to the dominant ﬁrm know-how. The increase in proﬁts of the dominant
ﬁrm due to the technological agreement does not compensate the loss
of proﬁt due to the increasing market power of the other ﬁrm (Figure
5);
• if instead the asymmetry in the initial costs is larger, only the ﬂow of
knowledge from the dominant ﬁr m( b o t hi nt h ed u o p o l yw i t hi n v o l u n -
tary spillover and in the sharing cartel) can prevent market monopoli-
sation (Figure 7);
• both the ﬁrms have strong incentives to join the cartel if the initial
cost gap is larger. The dominant ﬁrm acts in a so favourable position
than it can be never threatened by the improving economic conditions
of the rival (Figure 7);
• under a low diﬀerence in the asymptotic value of the marginal cost or
in the rate of learning, even if monopolisation never occurs, it is in
the interest of both the ﬁrms to make the Technological Sharing Cartel
(Figure 8, Figure 10);
• if the asymmetry in the asymptotic value of the marginal cost is bigger,
no kind of information ﬂow can prevent market monopolisation (Figure
9);
21• if the bigger asymmetry is due to rate the of learning, knowledge trans-
mission is beneﬁcial since can make the weaker ﬁrm survive. But, the
dominant ﬁrm perceives bigger proﬁts protecting its knowledge due to
learning by doing activity (Figure 11).
In the symmetric case, the following conclusions are remarkable:
• the proﬁt level of the ﬁrm acting in a technology sharing cartel is very
close to the proﬁt level perceived when the ﬁrm colludes. But the
individual quantity in the case of collusion is sensitively lower that in
the case of the Technology Sharing Cartel. Consequently, the level of
price in the Technological Sharing Cartel scenario is lower than in the
collusion case.
In this paper we analyse the impact of learning spillovers on prices, proﬁts
and market structure when the decision mechanism of the duopolist is based
on a rule of thumb. The next step should be to build a model in which
the ﬂow of information is the result of speciﬁc R&D decisions. In the real
market, we observe the coexistence of ﬁrms participating to TSC and ﬁrms
outside it; we think that models to describe this stylised fact can be useful.
A Appendix
A.1 The Symmetric Case
A.1.1 The Proprietary Regime











































A(q1t + q2t)β − Aq1tβ(q1t + q2t)β−1







= A(q1t + q2t)







= A(q1t + q2t)








= A(q1t + q2t)




Equation of output produced by ﬁrm 1 (q1t;x5:)
q1t+1 = q1t + v{A(q1t + q2t)




Equation of output produced by ﬁrm 2 (q2t;x6):
q2t+1 = q2t + v{A(q1t + q2t)




23Equation of aggregate quantity (Qt;x1):





















− [c0(1 + w1t)−D + c0(1 + w2t)−D +2 cmin]}}β
The cumulative output equation for ﬁrm 1 is given by (w1t;x7):
w1t+1 = w1t + q1t
The cumulative output equation for ﬁrm 2 is given by (w2t;x8):
w2t+1 = w2t + q2t
A.1.2 Duopoly with Spillovers
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(q1t + q2t)β − [c
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(q1t + q2t)β − [c
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= A(q1t + q2t)
−(β+1) [(q1t + q2t) − βq1t] − [c






= A(q1t + q2t)
−(β+1) [(1 − β)q1t + q2t] − [c
0(1 + w1t + αw2t)
−D + c
min]




= A(q1t + q2t)
−(β+1) [(1 − β)q1t + q2t] − [c
0(1 + w2t + αw1t)
−D + c
min]
Equation of output produced by ﬁrm 1 (q1t;x5:)
q1t+1 = q1t + v{A(q1t + q2t)
−(β+1) [(1 − β)q1t + q2t] − [c
0(1 + w1t + αw2t)
−D + c
min]}
Equation of output produced by ﬁrm 2 (q2t;x6):
25q2t+1 = q2t + v{A(q1t + q2t)
−(β+1) [(1 − β)q2t + q1t] − [c
0(1 + w2t + αw1t)
−D + c
min]}
Equation of aggregate quantity (Qt;x1):








0(1 + w1t + αw2t)
−D + c













−[c0(1 + w1t + αw2t)−D + c0(1 + w2t + αw1t)−D +2 cmin]}}β
The cumulative output equation for ﬁrm 1 is given by (w1t;x7):
w1t+1 = w1t + q1t
The cumulative output equation for ﬁrm 2 is given by (w2t;x8):
w2t+1 = w2t + q2t
A.1.3 Technology Sharing Cartels











































A(q1t + q2t)β − Aq1tβ(q1t + q2t)β−1







= A(q1t + q2t)







= A(q1t + q2t)








= A(q1t + q2t)




Equation of output produced by ﬁrm 1 (q1t;x5:)
q1t+1 = q1t + v{A(q1t + q2t)




Equation of output produced by ﬁrm 2 (q2t;x6):
27q2t+1 = q2t + v{A(q1t + q2t)




Equation of aggregate quantity (Qt;x1):



















− [2c0(1 + wt)−D +2 cmin]}}β
The cumulative output equation for ﬁrm 1 is given by (wt;x7):
wt+1 = wt + q1t + q2t
A.1.4 Full Collusion






Firm1 proﬁtf u n c t i o ni s:
π1t =
Aq1t
(q1t + q2t)β − [c
0(1 + w1t + αw2t)
−D + c
min]q1t
Firm 2 proﬁt function is :
π2t =
Aq2t
(q1t + q2t)β − [c
0(1 + w2t + αw1t)
−D + c
min]q2t
Total proﬁtf u n c t i o n( πt;x4):
28πt = π1t + π2t =
=
Aq1t
(q1t + q2t)β − [c





(q1t + q2t)β − [c






0(1 + w1t + αw2t)
−D + c
min]Qt




= A(1 − β)(Qt)
−β − [c
0(1 + w1t + αw2t)
−D + c
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Equation of output produced by ﬁrm 1 (q1t;x5:)





Equation of output produced by ﬁrm 2 (q2t;x6):





Equation of aggregate quantity (Qt;x1):








{Qt + v{A(1 − β)(Qt)−β − [c0(1 + wt)−D + cmin]}β






















The cumulative output equation for ﬁrm 1 is given by (w1t;x7):
w1t+1 = w1t + q1t
The cumulative output equation for ﬁrm 2 is given by (w2t;x8):
w2t+1 = w2t + q2t
A.2 The Asymmetric Case (but with v1 = v2 = v)
A.2.1 Duopoly with Spillovers










1t = q1tpt − [c
0








(q1t + q2t)β − [c
0








2t = q2tpt − [c
0








(q1t + q2t)β − [c
0









A(q1t + q2t)β − Aq1tβ(q1t + q2t)β−1
(q1t + q2t)2β − [c
0







= A(q1t + q2t)
−(β+1) [(q1t + q2t) − βq1t] − [c
0







= A(q1t + q2t)
−(β+1) [(1 − β)q1t + q2t] − [c
0








= A(q1t + q2t)
−(β+1) [(1 − β)q1t + q2t] − [c
0




Equation of output produced by ﬁrm 1 (q1t;x5:)
q1t+1 = q1t + v{A(q1t + q2t)
−(β+1) [(1 − β)q1t + q2t] − [c
0




Equation of output produced by ﬁrm 2 (q2t;x6):
q2t+1 = q2t + v{A(q1t + q2t)
−(β+1) [(1 − β)q2t + q1t] − [c
0




Equation of aggregate quantity (Qt;x1):









1(1 + w1t + α1w2t)
−D1 + c
0

















1(1 + w1t + α1w2t)−D1 + c0
2(1 + w2t + α2w1t)−D2 + cmin
1 + cmin
2 ]}}β
The cumulative output equation of the cartel is given by (w1t;x7):
wt+1 = wt + Qt
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